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Almost all cases reach the U.S. Supreme Court’s merits 
docket through discretionary grants of writs of certiorari. On 
rare occasions, the Court will dismiss a writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted, or DIG the case. The DIG process has 
received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature. 
This article fi lls that gap in several ways. First, it documents 
and analyses the 155 cases the Court DIGged in the Warren, 
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts (1954 through 2004 Terms). 
Second, the article examines how the Court’s decision to 
DIG a case relates to a number of legal and extralegal factors. 
Finally, it considers whether DIGs should be conceptualized 
as, or are sometimes examples of, sophisticated strategic 
behavior by the Justices.
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
A public institution that is vested with discretion to decide whether 
to decide the merits of a controversy has considerable power on that 
basis alone. This is true of the U.S. Supreme Court. For over 80 years, 
since the passage of the Judges’ Bill in 1925, the majority of cases 
reach the merits docket of the Court through discretionary grants of 
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1 Almost all of the cases in the past 25 years have reached the Court on a writ of 
certiorari. Prior to then, a considerable percentage of cases each Term came via puta-
tively mandatory appeals from lower federal courts and state courts. Amendments to 
jurisdictional statutes in the 1980s reduced such mandatory appeals to a trickle. David 
M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 227 (Norton, 7th 
ed 2005).
2 We use the partial acronym that prevails in the scholarly literature and, appar-
ently, on the Court itself. The common usage for the past tense of a DIG is DIGged, 
not DUG. H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States 
Supreme Court 39, 106 (Harvard 1991). The term has been characterized as a “rare 
instance of judicial self- criticism.” Michael W. Schwartz, Our Fractured Supreme 
Court, 2008 Pol’y Rev 3, 15 (Feb & March).
3 For a good overview of the considerable literature on the certiorari process, see 
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex L Rev 257, 292- 95 (2005).
4 For example, Richard L. Revesz and Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the 
Supreme Court, 136 U Pa L Rev 1067 (1988); Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: 
forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J Pol Phil 74 (2005).
5 For example, Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court 87-88 (CQ Press, 8th ed 2008); 
Perry, Deciding to Decide at 36, 106-09 (cited in note 2); O’Brien, Storm Center at 
215- 16 (cited in note 1).
6 Scott A. Hendrickson, To DIG or not to DIG: Using DIGs to Examine Supreme 
Court Decision Making and Agenda Setting (paper presented at 2003 annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association).
writs of certiorari.1 After certiorari is granted, typically the parties 
will brief the case, oral argument will be held, the Justices will dis-
cuss the case at their conference, and eventually then decide the case 
through the release of a written opinion. On rare occasions, however, 
the Court interrupts that process by deciding that they do not want 
to decide the case, after all. In those instances, they dismiss the writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted, or DIG2 the case.
Given the importance of the Court’s agenda- setting power, legal 
scholars and political scientists have devoted considerable atten-
tion to the certiorari process as a whole.3 They have devoted less 
attention, however, to DIGs. Some legal scholars have addressed the 
jurisprudential question of how many votes should be necessary to 
DIG a case, given the norm that only four votes are necessary to 
grant certiorari.4 Social scientists, addressing the certiorari process, 
have discussed DIGs in passing.5 In both instances, DIGs are usually 
addressed in an anecdotal fashion, perhaps not surprising given the 
paucity of numbers of DIGs.
Only recently have DIGs begun to receive systematic treatment in 
the literature. Hendrickson6 documented the DIGs rendered by the 
Burger Court (1969 through 1985 Terms), and compared the disposi-
tion of those cases to the cases decided on the merits by the Court. 
Among other things, he examined whether the Court was more likely 
to DIG cases of apparent marginal importance (as determined by the 
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7 Michael E. Solimine and Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empir-
ical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 Wis L Rev 1421.
8 James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction- Reform Proposals, Discre-
tionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 Vand L Rev 895, 924 (1973).
9 Rice v Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc, 349 U.S. 70, 78 & n 2 (1955).
10 For a detailed summary of the various reasons the Court has articulated for DIG-
ging a case, see Eugene Gressman, et al, Supreme Court Practice 358- 62 (BNA, 9th ed 
2007).
number of amicus briefs fi led in the case), and whether the Court was 
more likely to DIG, and thus leave intact, a decision below that ruled 
in an ideological conservative direction. Solimine and Gely7 docu-
mented all of the DIGs rendered by the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts (1954 through 2004 Terms) and, among other things, exam-
ined how often the Court, collectively or through individual Justices, 
explained why it DIGged a case, and how often the issue raised in a 
DIGged case returned to the Court in subsequent litigation.
In this article, we extend this literature in several ways. In part II, 
we provide a brief overview of the certiorari and DIG process, and 
explore the possible motivations for the Court to DIG a case. In Part 
III we describe our data, and in Part IV we discuss our results. Part V 
concludes the paper.
I I .  A  M O D E L  O F  S U P R E M E  C O U R T  D I G 
D E C I S I O N S
The possibility of the Court DIGging a case has been around as long, 
it appears, as the certiorari process itself. At hearings in Congress for 
the Judges’ Bill, Justice Willis Van Devanter mentioned that under 
certain circumstances, such as facts coming to the Justice’s atten-
tion after certiorari was granted, the Court would DIG the case.8 The 
Court itself stated in 1955, in a case it was DIGging, that it had dis-
posed of over 60 cases that way since 1911.9 Often the Court will DIG 
a case with a simple order so stating. On other occasions, the Court 
will explain in a published opinion why it is DIGging the case. When 
it has done so, it has variously stated that a full review of record, 
often aided by oral argument, reveals that there are jurisdictional or 
procedural defects that prevent the Court from reaching the issue 
presented in the writ of certiorari; or that intervening court decisions 
or statutory changes make it unnecessary or inappropriate to reach 
the merits of the case; or, in general, that there are changed circum-
stances that make it appropriate for the Court to DIG the case, rather 
than decide it on the merits.10
No statute or formal rule governs the internal processes of the 
Court in deciding whether to grant certiorari or, subsequently, to 
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11 Solimine and Gely, 2005 Wis L Rev at 1426- 27, 1441- 47 (cited in note 7).
12 The attitudinal perspective assumes that the Justices rely in important and deter-
minative ways on their policy preferences, broadly defi ned. The strategic perspective 
assumes that the Justices take into account the anticipated decisions of other political 
actors, starting with the other members of the Court. Strategic decision makers may 
sacrifi ce short- term goals for long- term interests. While the distinction between “stra-
tegic” and “attitudinal” models has generated substantial debate in the literature (e.g., 
Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior 5- 21 
(Princeton 2006)), recent work suggests that the two models might not be entirely 
inconsistent. For example, Spiller and Gely argue that to some extent the strategic 
approach generalizes the attitudinal model. They point out that the strategic model 
has always recognized that there is a range of policy over which justices may vote their 
preferences without the fear of reversal. In that sense, the strategic model provides 
room for other forces (e.g., judicial norms) to affect judicial decision- making process. 
Pablo T. Spiller and Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision Making in The Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Politics 34 (Oxford; Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Keleman, 
and Gregory A. Caldeira, eds, 2008).
13 Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmayer, Strategy on the United States Supreme 
Court (Cambridge 2009); Thomas H. Hammond, et al, Strategic Behavior and Policy 
Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford 2005).
DIG a case. Rather, the Court has followed a long- standing informal 
norm of granting certiorari whenever at least four Justices vote to do 
so, otherwise known as the Rule of Four. While the voting protocols 
for DIGs are less clear, it appears that the Court will usually only 
DIG a case when at least six Justices vote to do so, otherwise known 
as the Rule of Six. The difference is justifi ed on the basis that if a 
supermajority vote to DIG a case were not required, then in theory 
the Rule of Four could be regularly subverted by fi ve Justices who did 
not vote to hear the case.11
Much of the existing literature on DIGs has been limited to describ-
ing the jurisprudential reasons offered by the Justices (when offered 
at all) in opinions accompanying decisions to DIG. In this article, 
we extend this literature by exploring various legal and extralegal 
factors that might be driving the Supreme Court’s DIG process and 
decisions.
There has been a long- standing debate among Supreme Court 
scholars on whether the Court’s fi nal decision on a case is primar-
ily motivated by the Justices’ “sincere” policy preferences (i.e., the 
attitudinal model) or by “strategic factors.”12 However, there appears 
to be widespread agreement that Court’s decisions preceding the 
fi nal vote can often be strategic in nature.13 For example, scholars 
from both the attitudinal and strategic camps acknowledge that in 
deciding whether to grant certiorari on a case, Justices are likely to 
take into account the anticipated decisions of other actors, includ-
ing those of other members of the Court. This literature suggests 
that Justices act strategically in the certiorari stage when they vote 
based not on their particular policy preferences, but in hopes avoid-
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14 For similar nomenclature, see Gregory A. Caldeira, et al, Sophisticated Voting 
and Gatekeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J L, Econ, & Organ 549 (1999). Spiller and 
Gely argue that the distinction between the attitudinal and strategic models is partic-
ularly blurred at the pre- fi nal vote stages. In particular, they note that it is likely that, 
forward looking decision making—the essence of the strategic model—is particularly 
likely at these early decision making stages. Spiller and Gely, Strategic Judicial Deci-
sion Making at 41 (cited in note 12).
15 For sources generally advancing this argument, see Lee Epstein, et al, Dynamic 
Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 Harv J Legis 395 (2002); Richard A. 
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Foreward: A Political Court, 119 Harv L 
Rev 31, 38- 40 (2005); Richard A. Posner, The Courthouse Mice, New Republic at 33 
(June 5 & 12, 2006).
16 We refer here to Alexander Bickel’s well- known use of this phrase. He approvingly 
included a DIG as an example of the Supreme Court periodically declining immedi-
ately to decide a diffi cult or contentious issue of constitutional law. Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 126- 27 
(Bobbs- Merrill 1962).
ing or facilitating their most desirable outcome at a later stage. For 
example, a Justice who might disagree with a lower court decision 
and would vote to reverse such decision on the merits, might vote to 
deny certiorari (and forgo the opportunity to reverse) if she believes 
that the majority of the Court would likely vote to affi rm the lower 
court decision if certiorari is granted.
Given that our focus is on the decision to DIG—one of the type 
of decisions which as the certiorari decision precedes the fi nal vote 
on the merits—we adopt the strategic model to the extent that it 
suggests that the Court’s decision regarding whether to DIG a case 
might be infl uenced by the Justices’ forward looking behavior, which 
for convenience we refer to as sophisticated behavior.14
A. Model
The subject matter of the case could affect the decision to DIG. Per-
haps certain types of cases are more likely to be DIGged. As any 
other resource- constrained organization, the Court is likely to con-
sider carefully how to use its limited resources and limited political 
capital. In order to conserve scarce resources, one would expect the 
Court to avoid both more complex cases, as well as cases involving 
particularly politically divisive issues. We can posit that cases rais-
ing issues of federal constitutional law are, generally speaking, more 
momentous and given the indeterminacy of constitutional text more 
diffi cult to resolve than those raising federal statutory and other 
non- constitutional issues.15 Accordingly, one would expect that the 
Court may be more willing to DIG constitutional cases, as opposed 
to non- constitutional ones. Put another way, a DIG may enable the 
Court to exercise the passive virtue16 of avoiding decision of a diffi -
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17 Of course, some non- constitutional cases can be complex (e.g., involving inde-
terminate statutory language) and also politically divisive, and one might expect that 
the Court might also use the DIG in those cases. Our claim is only that to the extent 
that the Court is more likely to use the DIG as an avenue to avoid more complex and 
politically diffi cult cases, and to the extent that constitutional cases are both more 
complex and politically momentous than non- constitutional cases, one could use the 
constitutional/ non- constitutional dichotomy as a proxy for the importance of the 
case. Other scholars have used other measures to gauge the importance of a case, apart 
from the constitutional/ non- constitutional dichotomy we employ. For example, Hen-
drickson used the rate of amicus fi lings as a surrogate for the importance of the case, 
as contrasted to our use of the subject matter of the case. The problem with the use of 
amicus briefs is that for much of the Rehnquist Court (not studied by Hendrickson) 
such briefs have been increasingly fi led in all cases (Ryan J. Owens and Lee Epstein, 
Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 Judicature 127 (2005)), diminishing its 
utility to distinguish cases. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the 
Infl uence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L & 
Soc’y Rev 807, 829 (2004). Other measures to gauge the signifi cance of Supreme Court 
decisions that have been advanced are references on the front page of the New York 
Times (Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 Am J Pol Sci 66 
(2000)), or in law review articles and Congressional hearings (C. Scott Peters, Getting 
Attention: The Effect of Legal Mobilization on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Attention to 
Issues, 60 Pol Res Q 561 (2007)). Sometimes a DIG does receive signifi cant attention 
in the media, such as Adarand Constructors, Inc v Mineta, 534 US 103 (2001) (per 
curiam), which involved the constitutionality of a federal affi rmative action program. 
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Dismisses Challenge in Its Main Affi rmative 
Action Case, NY Times at A23 (Nov 29, 2001). Another example is Medellin v Dretke, 
544 US 660 (2005) (per curiam), which presented the issue of when an American court 
should give weight to a decision of the International Court of Justice. See Solimine and 
Gely, 2005 Wis L Rev at 1423 n 18 (cited in note 7).
cult or controversial case of constitutional law, even after an ini-
tial decision (by at least four Justices) to review the case. This turn 
of events might be less likely for lower profi le non- constitutional 
cases.17 Therefore, under this line of reasoning, we might expect DIG 
cases disproportionately to consist of constitutional cases, as com-
pared to the Court’s merits docket as a whole.
Hypothesis 1: DIGged cases should systematically raise consti-
tutional issues more often than the merits docket as a whole.
We might also expect that the size of the docket will have an effect 
on the number of DIGged cases. All things being equal, we might 
expect a larger number of cases to generate more opportunities and 
incentives for the Justices to DIG cases. As the number of cases which 
the Court agrees to decide increases, the more strained the Court’s 
resources become. Thus, one would expect that the Court would be 
more likely to DIG a case when facing a larger docket.
Hypothesis 2: The larger the merits docket, the more likely 
cases will be DIGged.
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18 For example, Hammond, Strategic Behavior (cited in note 13); Caldeira, Sophisti-
cated Voting (cited in note 14); Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, 
Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and 
the Merits, 69 Ohio St L J 1 (2008).
19 Margaret Meriwhether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certio-
rari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 Wash U L 
Q 389, 411- 12 (2004).
20 For example, one book length treatment of the topic makes no mention to DIGs 
(Hammond, Strategic Behavior (cited in note 13)), while another makes only two 
brief references to the topic (Brenner and Whitmeyer, Strategy at 141, 174 (cited in 
note 13).
21 There are some strictly anecdotal accounts suggesting that Justices might have 
DIGged a case for what could be called strategic reasons. See Solimine and Gely, 2005 
Wis L Rev at 1456- 59 (cited in note 7), discussing Rice v Sioux City Memorial Park 
Cemetery, Inc, 349 US 70 (1955) and Burrell v McCray, 426 US 471 (1976) (per curiam)). 
Rice involved a challenge to a racially restrictive covenant in contracts involving 
burial. The Supreme Court eventually DIGged the case after the state passed a law 
prohibiting such covenants, albeit nonretroactively. The majority explained that the 
changed circumstances made the case an inappropriate vehicle to render a possibly 
“divisive” disposition. According to some writers, the outcome is better explained 
by the time, coming shortly after the controversy generated by Brown v Board of 
Education, 347 US 483 (1954). A majority of the Court may have wished to avoid 
ruling on a racially charged issue. Stephen L. Wasby, et al, Desegregation from Brown 
to Alexander 134- 37 (Southern Illinois 1977); Del Dickson, State Court Defi ance and 
the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 Yale L J 
1423, 1472- 74 (1994). Two decades later, the Court in Burrell  DIGged a case raising the 
important and then- unresolved issue of whether a plaintiff in a civil rights action in 
federal court must fi rst exhaust all available state administrative remedies. The major-
ity, without an explanatory opinion, DIGged the case. In a cryptic concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens variously stated that the opinion below (which held no exhaustion was 
required) had correctly stated the law, and that at least one Justice who had originally 
voted to grant certiorari had changed his mind. According to other accounts, different 
sets of Justices had variously voted to grant certiorari to either affi rm or reverse the 
decision below, but with some vote switching a majority eventually decided to DIG 
There is a growing literature on the apparent strategic behavior 
of Supreme Court Justices in general, and regarding the certiorari 
process in particular.18 According to this literature, Justices act stra-
tegically when they do not vote at an early stage of a voting process 
for their preferred alternative, in hopes of achieving a more desirable 
outcome at a later stage. For example, a Justice might vote to deny 
certiorari if she does not want the entire Court to decide the merits 
of the case, and perhaps affi rm a decision she believes was wrongly 
decided.19
The cert literature says little about the DIG process as an example, 
or not, of strategic behavior.20 As discussed earlier, the same reason-
ing that is made with respect to the strategic certiorari vote could be 
made regarding the decision to DIG. In theory, the DIG could be used 
in a strategic way.21 For example, if only four Justices vote to grant 
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to avoid confronting the issue. Solimine and Gely, 2005 Wis L Rev at 1458-59 (cited in 
note 7). A recent exception to the relative lack of attention to DIGs in this literature 
is Hendrickson (cited in note 6). Focusing on DIGs by the Burger Court, he concluded 
that the Court was at least in part acting strategically. Not everyone agrees with the 
strategic account of the decision to DIG. In his study, based primarily on interviews of 
certain Justices and their law clerks, H.W. Perry concluded that “[u]sually” cases are 
DIGged for “mundane, jurisprudential considerations.” It is quite rare, he continued, 
for DIGs to be used strategically, because it “would be easily and quickly observed, and 
it would completely undercut the fi nality of the cert. conference.” Perry, Deciding to 
Decide at 106, 109 (cited in note 2).
22 Arguably, following the Rule of Six could also be considered evidence of strategic 
behavior where the rule serves as an impediment to DIG cases which fi ve Justices 
believe, based on legal considerations, should not have been considered at all by the 
Court. Thus, while one cannot say with absolute certainty that a supermajority DIG 
vote is nonstrategic, it would appear to be the case that 5-4 DIG votes are likely to be 
motivated by strategic considerations. To put the point another way, the Rules of Four 
and Six themselves might be characterized as strategic devices in the fi rst instance, 
making it diffi cult to conceptualize all departures from those rules as envitably strate-
gic. Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small 89- 
91, 102 (Oxford 2007) (noting that these rules can be used to set institutional agendas 
and make transparent decisions that are ultimately reached by majority vote). However, 
given the rules as a baseline, departures from them for anything other than traditional 
legal reasons can be presumptively characterized as sophisticated behavior.
certiorari, then presumably the remaining fi ve could DIG the case 
every time. Another possibility is that after a Justice votes at the cer-
tiorari stage, the Justice could realize as the case marched on that the 
vote on the merits will reach an undesirable outcome, so the Justice 
could try to convince at least four others to DIG the case. Therefore, 
if the Justices are strategically making the decision to DIG, we would 
primarily expect to see 5-4 votes. Strategic Justices will presumably 
ignore the Rule of Six and vote to DIG those cases in which they have 
voted to deny certiorari.22
Hypothesis 3: If DIGs are strategic, one would be more likely to 
observe 5-4 as compared to supermajority DIG votes.
A particularly interesting aspect of Hendrickson’s paper is his 
examination of the ideological direction of the lower court decision 
being reviewed. Since a DIG leaves the lower court decision intact, 
a strategic Court might, all things being equal, wish to leave intact 
a decision that was compatible with an ideological majority of the 
Court. Moreover, DIGging the case eliminates the possibility that a 
member of the ideological minority (to put the matter crudely) may 
be able to convince a member of the majority to switch positions on 
the merits, thus upsetting expectations that drove the decision to 
grant certiorari in the fi rst instance. Hendrickson found that 96% of 
the cases DIGged by the Burger Court were decided conservatively 
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23 Hendrickson, To DIG or not to DIG at 18- 19 (cited in note 6).
24 Arguably, the broader the applicability of a lower court of appeals decision, the 
stronger the incentives a strategic Court would have to DIG an ideologically consistent 
lower court decision. So for example, certain decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit are presumably applicable for the entire country, in that review 
of certain administrative decisions is exclusively vested in that circuit. For example, 
Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7607(b)(1) (2000) (review of standards and regulations). See 
Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 Yale L J 676, 712 
n 69 (2007) (giving other examples). In contrast, decisions of the DC Circuit in cases 
where there is no such exclusive jurisdiction, and almost all decisions of other courts 
of appeals, are presumably applicable only in the circuit where the court of appeals 
issuing the decision sits. Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence 
by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L J 679, 716, 727 (1989). Accordingly, a 
liberal Supreme Court might have a stronger incentive to DIG a liberal decision by the 
DC Circuit, or at least those that fall within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, than a 
liberal decision by any other appeals court. In any case, such a liberal court will have 
a stronger incentive to DIG liberal court of appeals decisions than conservative court 
of appeals decisions, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
25 Hammond, Strategic Behavior (cited in note 13); Forrest Maltzman, et al, Craft-
ing Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge 2000). 
26 Hammond, Strategic Behavior at 2 (cited in note 13).
by the court being reviewed, while only 46% of the cases decided on 
the merits could be so described. Both measures were statistically 
signifi cant. Based on these measures and others, Hendrickson con-
cluded that, with various caveats, the DIG process on the Court is 
motivated by more than the nominal legal considerations.23
Hypothesis 4: A strategic Court is more likely to DIG cases in 
which the lower court decision is ideologically consistent with 
the preferred ideological direction of the majority of the Court.24
Recent work by Hammond, et al. and Maltzman et al. focus on the 
possibility of strategic decision- making process within the Court.25 
Hammond et al., identify fi ve stages at which the Justices could 
behave strategically. First, the Justices must decide whether to hear 
a case (i.e., the decision to grant a writ of certiorari). Second, after the 
writ of certiorari has been granted and oral arguments have occurred, 
the Court meets for what is referred to as the “conference vote,” a pre-
liminary vote on how the case should be decided. Third, at this point 
the Chief Justice, or the most senior associate Justice in the majority 
when the Chief Justice is not in the majority, assigns the writing 
of the majority opinion. Fourth, the author of the majority opinion 
must try to write an opinion that gains majority support. Finally, 
each Justice must decide whether to join, concur, or dissent.26
By examining the votes of the individual Justices throughout these 
fi ve stages, one can identify instances of strategic behavior. For ex-
ample, Hammond et al. argue that a Court with strategic Justices 
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27 Id at 221.
28 We used the search term “improvident w/ 10 grant” in a computer search of the 
Westlaw database. Given the limits of computer searches, we cannot say with meta-
physical certitude that we obtained every DIG case, but we are confi dent we collected 
virtually every one. Our computer search captured all of the DIG cases cited in the 
secondary literature cited in this paper.
will grant certiorari “if and only if there exists a set of policies that a 
majority of Justices prefer to SQ [the status quo].”27 That is, strategic 
Justices will only grant a petition for certiorari if there exists a set 
of policies that a majority of the Justices prefer to the status quo. If 
there is no set of policies that the majority of Justices prefer to SQ, it 
will be wasteful for a strategic Justice to spend any resources hearing 
and deciding a dispute in which the outcome cannot be changed. In 
turn, note Hammond et al., in a strategic Court, the Justices that 
support the grant of certiorari will be the same Justices who support 
the fi nal opinion, while those who opposed the grant of certiorari 
will not support the fi nal opinion. Those Justices who voted to grant 
certiorari are expected to support a fi nal outcome which improves 
over SQ, while those Justices for whom the fi nal outcome does not 
improve SQ would have voted to deny certiorari and also against the 
fi nal outcome itself.
The Hammond et al. model can easily be expanded to incorporate 
the decision to DIG, particularly as it relates to the certiorari deci-
sion. If a Justice who votes to deny certiorari will also vote against 
the fi nal decision on the merits, it must also be the case that such 
Justice will also vote to DIG the case since doing so allows that Jus-
tice the ability to prevent the realization of a fi nal policy outcome 
which does not improve over SQ. That is, a Justice that votes to deny 
certiorari will presumably welcome the opportunity to dismiss the 
case before the fi nal decision is made. On the other hand, since those 
Justices that vote to grant certiorari will only do so if there is a set of 
policies that improve over the SQ, they will not be inclined to DIG a 
case, since a fi nal vote in the case is better for them than SQ.
Hypothesis 5: If DIGs are strategic, Justices who vote to DIG the 
case will be the same Justices voting to deny certiorari.
I I I .  D ATA
We are interested in providing a fuller and more contextual account 
of the DIG process on the Supreme Court. To that end, we began by 
identifying the cases DIGged by the Court during the Warren (1954-
1968 Terms), Burger (1969-1985 Terms), and Rehnquist (1986-2004 
Terms) Courts, a total of 51 years.28 Like Hendrickson, we coded the 
cases for several variables, such as the subject matter of the case 
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29 The sample was selected using the same criteria as Hendrickson, To DIG or not 
to DIG, at 15 n 21 (cited in note 6).
30 We use the “Auth_Dec” variable in the Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial 
Data Base as the source for the classifi cation. This variable asks a question very similar 
to the one we ask in our analysis, to wit, “Did the majority determine the constitu-
tionality of some action by some unit or offi cial of the federal government including 
an interstate compact?”
31 We use the “Dir” variable in Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base as 
the source for the classifi cation.
32 We use the “LCTDIR” variable in Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data 
Base as the source for the classifi cation.
33 We used Lee Epstein et al, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions 
and Developments (CQ Press, 4th ed 2007) as the source for the number of total cases 
decided by the Court per Term.
being DIGged and the voting lineup in the case. We compare the 
DIGged cases to those where the Court grants certiorari and proceeds 
to resolve the case on the merits. Similar to Hendrickson, we use the 
Spaeth’s Supreme Court database to test our model.29
From 1954 to 2004, the Court DIGged 155 cases, about three per 
Term. This represents 2% of all cases decided by the Court during that 
period. By our measure, 36% of the cases raised at least one issue of 
federal constitutional law, as compared to non- constitutional issues 
(e.g., issues of federal statutory or administrative law).30 In 52% of the 
cases, the Court decision can be characterized as a liberal decision,31 
while 45% of the cases in that sample involved lower court decisions 
characterized as liberal.32
I V.  A N A LY S I S
We fi rst explore the relationship between the decision to DIG and the 
type of issue involved in the case. Table 1 shows the cross- tabulation 
of the type of issue involved in the case (using our “constitutional” 
or “other” categorization) and whether or not the Court DIGged the 
case. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the data demonstrate that com-
pared to all other Court’s decisions on the merits during this period, 
the Court was more likely to DIG cases raising constitutional issues. 
These results are consistent with the view that the Court might pre-
fer to avoid resolving cases on constitutional grounds, or avoid such 
cases altogether, either because of their complexity or divisiveness 
on the Court itself, or because of their political saliency. The Court 
appears to use the DIG as a device, a second opportunity after the 
certiorari decision itself, to avoid resolving perhaps diffi cult and con-
tentious constitutional issues.
Regarding the effect of the docket on the decision to DIG, our 
results suggest that the docket size does not affect the decision to 
DIG a case.33 Figure 1 plots the number of cases decided on the merits 
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34 Id at 80- 81.
35 The two series show a statistically insignifi cant correlation of –.02.
36 This result is interesting since during this same period the Court has changed in 
several other ways. For example, Calabresi and Lindgren show that during this period 
the average tenure of service of Supreme Court Justices has increased. Steven G. Cala-
and the number of DIGged cases per term. While the number of cases 
decided on the merits increased from 1954 to 1982 and then decreased 
to the initial levels (e.g., 78 cases in 1954; 151 cases in 1982; 74 cases 
in 2004),34 no clear pattern is discernable with regard to the DIGged 
cases.35 This comparison suggests that contrary to Hypothesis 2, the 
decision to DIG is not related to the number of cases in the Court’s 
docket. This somewhat surprising result may suggest that overall 
number of DIGs are, all things be equal, the result of relatively ran-
dom and idiosyncratic factors, and that there is not an expected rate 
of DIGs in any given time period.36
Figure 1. DIGged Cases and Cases Decided on the Merits by Term
Table 1. Decision to DIG and Type of Case
  DIGged  Cases Decided on the Merits  Total
Constitutional 98 (64.5%) 2505 (36.12%) 2603
Other 54 (35.5%) 4459 (64.38%) 4513
Total  152  6934  7086
Table presents frequencies. Column percentages in parentheses. Chi- Square = 52.09, 
signifi cant at the .001 level. We could not classify three of the DIGged cases.
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bresi and James Lindgren, Terms Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsid-
ered, 29 Harv J Law & Pub Pol 770, 777- 88 (2006).
37 See Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discre-
tion, Reputation, and the Rule of Four, 15 J Theoretical Pol 61, 70- 71 & n 26 (2003); 
Solimine and Gely, 2005 Wis L Rev at 1448 (cited in note 7); Vermeule, 13 J Pol Phil at 
90- 92 (cited in note 4). See also Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choice Justices Make 
121 (CQ Press 19998) (suggesting that “systematic departures from the Rule of Four 
[i.e., DIGs by a 5-4 vote] remain rare because they may generate informal sanctions 
such as a . . . dissent, which would make public otherwise private information about 
the certiorari vote”) .
With respect to the votes on DIGs (Hypothesis 3), our data on point 
are presented in Figure 2. As documented there, in only fourteen of 
the 155 cases did the Court DIG with less than a supermajority vote. 
There were fourteen (9%) examples of a DIG by a 5-4 vote. Eighty-
 three of the DIGs (53.5%) were decided without recorded dissent. 
These facts suggest that the norm of a Rule of Six is a durable (though 
not immutable) one. Knowing that she will not always be in a major-
ity in any given case, or set of cases, it appears that an individual 
Justice in most instances is willing to leave the Rule of Six intact 
as an implicit limit on strategic behavior. Individual Justices, and 
the Court as a whole, may support the Rule of Six to lubricate intra-
 Court reciprocity and harmony.37
Figure 2. Voting Patterns in DIGged Cases
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38 See Hendrickson, To DIG or not to DIG at 11 (cited in note 6).
39 The relatively high percentage of conservative lower court decisions DIGged by 
the Warren Court is probably related to the fact that, as compared to the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, the Warren Court decided a much higher proportion of cases where 
the lower court decision was conservative. Using the Spaeth database, the propor-
tion of conservative to liberal lower court opinions decided by the Warren Court is 
approximately seventy- fi ve conservative to twenty- fi ve liberal. US Supreme Court 
Databases. That is, the Warren Court was reviewing conservative lower court opin-
ions more often than liberal ones by a three- to-one margin. However, for the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts the proportion of conservative to liberal lower court decisions is 
approximately one to one. Still, as our results indicate, these two Courts were signifi -
cantly more likely to DIG conservative lower court decisions, as compared to liberally 
decided lower court decisions. (Solimine and Gely, 2005 Wis L Rev at 1439 n 74) (cited 
in note 7). For further discussion of the relationship between the Court’s manage-
ment of its docket and the ideological direction of lower federal court decisions, see 
Kevin M. Scott, Shaping the Supreme Court’s Federal Certiorari Docket, 27 Justice 
Sys J 191, 201- 02 (2006).
Our data also generally supports the proposition that strategic 
DIGs will leave intact decisions below that are ideologically com-
patible with the majority in the Supreme Court (Hypothesis 4). 
As described earlier, prior research advances the hypothesis that a 
conservative Supreme Court will be more likely to DIG a conserva-
tive lower court decision and that the opposite will hold for a lib-
eral leaning Supreme Court.38 Panels (B) and (C) of Table 2 shows 
that both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were more likely to DIG 
cases decided conservatively by the lower court, ninety- one percent 
and eighty- fi ve percent of the time, respectively. On the other hand, 
about half of the cases in which the Court issued a decision on the 
merits were decided conservatively by the lower court. These results 
indicate, consistent with Hypothesis 4, that a conservative Court is 
more likely to DIG a conservative lower court decision. The results 
shown in Panel (A) suggest that a liberally leaning Court is not, how-
ever, more likely to DIG liberal Cases. The Warren Court appeared 
to behave similar to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, as illustrated 
by the fact that about ninety- one percent of the DIGged cases were 
conservative lower court decisions. However, unlike the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, the Warren Court reviewed on the merits more 
than twice as many conservatively decided than liberally decided 
lower court decisions.39
In addition to the above descriptive statistics, we conducted logis-
tic regression analysis. Table 3 provides the variable defi nitions, 
while Table 4 provides the logistic regression results. We regressed the 
Court’s decision to DIG a case on several variables related to the type 
of issue involved in the case (ISSUE); the number of cases decided on 
the merits in a particular term (DOCKET); and the ideological direc-
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tion of the lower court decision. This last factor was operationalized 
with three dummy variables. The variable DIRLCTW captures those 
cases decided during the Warren court years involving a liberal lower 
court decision. The variables DIRLCTB and DIRLCTR capture cases 
decided during the Burger and Rehnquist courts respectively involv-
ing a conservative lower court decision.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results indicate that the court 
is more likely to DIG cases that involve constitutional issues as op-
posed to non- constitutional issues (ISSUE). Our results also show that 
Table 2(a). Decision to DIG and Direction of Lower Court Decision, Warren Court
  DIGged  Cases Decided on the Merits Total
Conservative Lower Court 
 Decision 51 (91.1%) 1416 (71.59%) 1467
Liberal Lower Court Decision 5 (8.9%) 562 (28.41%) 567
Total  56  1978  2032
Panel A presents frequencies. Column percentages in parentheses. Chi- Square = 10.28 
signifi cant at the .001 level.
Table 2(b). Decision to DIG and Direction of Lower Court Decision, Burger Court
  DIGged  Cases Decided on the Merits Total
Conservative Lower Court 
 Decision 52 (91.3%) 1258 (45.95%) 1310
Liberal Lower Court Decision 5 (8.7%) 1480 (54.05%) 1485
Total  57  2738  2796
Panel B presents frequencies. Column percentages in parentheses. Chi- Square = 92.44, 
signifi cant at the .001 level.
Table 2(c). Decision to DIG and Direction of Lower Court Decision, Rehnquist 
Court
  DIGged  Cases Decided on the Merits  Total
Conservative Lower Court 
 Decision 34 (85.0%) 974 (48.36%) 1008
Liberal Lower Court Decision 6 (15.0%) 1039 (51.59%) 1045
Total  40  2014  2054
Panel C presents frequencies. Column percentages in parentheses. Chi- Square = 21.08, 
signifi cant at the .001 level.
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contrary to Hypothesis 2, the size of the Court’s docket (DOCKET) 
does not appear to affect the Court’s use of the DIGs, as this variable 
was statistically non- signifi cant. Thus, the smaller dockets of the 
later Rehnquist Court did not lead to systematically fewer DIGs.
Regarding the ideological direction of the lower court decision, our 
results show that, as expected, both the Burger and Rehnquist courts 
were more likely to DIG cases in which the lower court decision was 
ideologically consistent with the preferred ideological direction of 
the majority of the Court. That is, both the Burger and Rehnquist 
courts were more likely to DIG cases involving conservative lower 
court decisions (DIRLCTB and DIRLCTR). Interestingly, the Warren 
Court was not more likely to DIG cases in which the lower court 
Table 3. Variable Defi nitions for Analysis in Table 4
Variable  Defi nition  Mean and S.D.
Dependent Variable
DIG Whether the Supreme Court decision in a case 
is a DIG
µ=.02; s.d.=.15
Source: Solimine & Gely (2005)
Independent Variables
ISSUE Type of Issue µ=.36;s.d.=.48
(1=Constitutional; 0=Other)
Sources: U.S. Supreme Court Database; 
Solimine & Gely (2005)




Source: Epstein, et al. 2007
DIRLCTW A dummy variable equal to 1 for cases decided 
during the Warren Court involving a liberal 
lower court decision
µ=.08; s.d.=.23
Source: U.S. Supreme Court Database
DIRLCTB A dummy variable equal to 1 for cases 
decided during the Burger Court involving a 
conservative lower court decision
µ=.19; s.d.=.39
Source: U.S. Supreme Court Database
DIRLCTR A dummy variable equal to 1 for cases decided 
during the Rehnquist Court involving a 
conservative lower court decision
µ=.14; s.d.=.35
Source: U.S. Supreme Court Database
Court dummies
 
Dummy terms for the three courts, with the 
Warren Court as the excluded group   
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40 Of course, given that the cases the Supreme Court considers is limited by the 
cases decided by the various lower courts (federal and state court of appeals) the ideo-
logical composition of the lower courts could affect the type of cases that the Supreme 
Court has an opportunity to review. To the extent that the courts of appeals were 
ideologically homogenous, one might expect them to produce a different mix of cases 
than what they might produce if they were ideologically mixed. We note, however, 
than during the period in question, the federal courts of appeals became more homog-
enous over time, at least as measured in terms of the political composition of the 
bench. In 1962 (half way through the Warren Court), there were 38 judges appointed 
by Democratic president, and 37 judges appointed by a Republican president. By 1996 
(again about half way through the Rehnquist Court) there were 54 judges appointed 
by Democratic presidents and 105 judges appointed by a Republican president. This 
information is gathered from volumes of the Federal Reporter for the respective 
years.
decision was ideologically consistent with a liberal position. The 
results indicate that the Warren Court was less likely to DIG liber-
ally decided lower court decisions (DIRLCTW). 40 Thus, to the extent 
that a decision to DIG an ideologically similar lower court decision 
is evidence of strategic behavior, the results suggest that the Burger 
Table 4. Regression Results
Dependent Variable: DIG













BURGER COURT – 2.16***
(.40)
REHNQUIST COURT – 1.79***
(.41)
N 6881
Likelihood Ratio Test  149.09***
*** (signifi cant at .01)
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41 Notice also that both court dummy coeffi cients (BURGER COURT and REHN-
QUIST COURT) were negative and signifi cant, suggesting that as compared to the 
Warren Court, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were less likely to vote to DIG a 
case.
42 The analysis is limited to these eight years since these are the only years cur-
rently available on line. We accessed Blackmun’s papers online at http:// epstein.law
.northwestern .edu/ research/ Blackmun .html.
43 The docket sheets include additional information regarding the processing of 
the case such as the various dates at which decisions were made on the case. Unlike 
some of the other documents included in the Blackmun’s papers, such as the “cert. 
pool” memos, the docket sheets of the cases we reviewed do not include any extensive 
annotation by Justice Blackmun.
44 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monet Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 Pol Analysis 
134 (2002).
45 The effect of the TENURE variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, strategic 
behavior might decrease as a Justice approaches retirement. To the extent that a Justice 
approaching retirement is less concerned with future retaliation by her colleagues, she 
might be more likely to engage in strategic behavior. On the other hand, to the extent 
that the Rule of Six is an institutional norm that is learned and internalized over time, 
one might observe a more frequent use of DIGs early on the Justices’ tenure.
and Rehnquist courts were more likely to behave strategically than 
the Warren Court.41
To explore the relationship between the vote to grant certiorari 
and the vote to DIG, we collected additional data on how individual 
Justices’ voted from Justice Harry Blackmun’s papers (“Blackmun’s 
papers), on those cases that were DIGged between 1986 and 1994.42 
The Blackmun papers include “docket sheets” which list all the Jus-
tices’ votes on certiorari, as well as their votes to DIG a case, among 
other information.43 Using the docket’s sheets we were able to code 
the individual Justice’s certiorari vote (CERTVOTE), as well as the 
DIG vote (DIGVOTE) in each case. We included the variables used 
in the earlier analysis: the type of issue involved in the case (ISSUE); 
the number of cases decided on the merits in each term (DOCKET), 
and a measure of the ideological direction of the lower court deci-
sions (DIRLCT). We also collected data on three control variables: 
the ideology of the individual justice as measured by the Martin-
 Quinn score (IDEOLOGY);44 the Justice’s tenure at the time the vote 
to DIG was made (TENURE); 45 and yearly dummies to account for 
any time trend effects.
We were able to collect data on a total of 22 cases, which in turn 
include 189 individual Justices’ votes. As described in Table 5, fi fty-
 fi ve percent of the cases in this group involved constitutional issues 
and 14 percent of the cases involved liberal lower courts decisions. 
Forty percent of the individual votes involved a vote to grant certio-
rari and 82 percent of the votes were DIG votes.
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46 Of course, to the extent that the certiorari vote is non- strategic, then a vote to 
DIG might not be strategic. If a Justice truly thought a case was not cert- worthy, then 
she is following her original position by later voting to DIG.
The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
A vote to deny certiorari (CERTVOTE) is positively and signifi cantly 
associated with a later vote to DIG a case (DIGVOTE). This fi nding 
is consistent with strategic voting. If as Hammond et al. suggest, the 
decision to grant cert. is strategic (in the sense that the Justices who 
support the grant of certiorari will be the same Justices who support 
the fi nal opinion, while those who opposed the grant of certiorari will 
not support the fi nal opinion) then a vote to deny certiorari ought to 
be positively related to a vote to DIG a case. That is, if the cert. vote 
is strategic, our results indicate that so is the vote to DIG.46
As in the earlier analysis (Table 4), we fi nd that the Justices are less 
likely to DIG cases involving a liberal decision at the lower court. 
Table 5. Variable Defi nitions for Analysis in Table 6
Variable  Defi nition  Mean and S.D.
Dependent Variable
DIGVOTE Individual Justice’s vote to DIG a case µ=.82; s.d.=.38
Source: Solimine & Gely (2005)
Independent Variables
ISSUE Type of Issue µ=.55; s.d.=.50
(1=Constitutional; 0=Other)
Sources: U.S. Supreme Court Database; 
Solimine & Gely (2005)




Source: Epstein, et al. 2007




Source: U.S. Supreme Court Database
CERTVOTE Individual Justice’s certiorari vote µ=.40; s.d.=.49
Source: Blackmun’s Papers
IDEOLOGY Quinn- Martin Ideology scores µ=.07; s.d.=.2.05
Source: Quinn- Martin
TENURE Number of years in Court µ=13.90; s.d.=9.03
Source: Epstein, et al. 2007
Year Dummies
 
Dummy terms for the each year, with 1986 
as the excluded group.   
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47 As mentioned earlier (note 45) to the extent that the decision to DIG is strategi-
cally motivated, a Justice might be more likely to vote to DIG a case as she gets closer 
to retirement. Our results, however suggests that Justices are more likely to DIG ear-
lier in their tenure. This result suggests that the use of DIG might be affected by insti-
tutional norms, which the Justice is more likely to follow as her tenure increases.
Finally, the TENURE variable, which measures the Justice tenure 
at the time of the DIG vote is negative and statistically signifi cant, 
which suggests that Justices are more likely to DIG cases earlier in 
their careers. 47 None of the year dummies was signifi cant.
V.  C O N C L U S I O N
The DIGs and the Supreme Court’s approach when DIGging a case 
remains, when compared to other aspects of the Supreme Court 
practice, a relatively unknown procedure. In this article, we explore 
some issues related to this relatively infrequently used, yet consis-
tent feature, of the Supreme Court docket. Following the work of 
Hendrickson we seek to provide both a theoretical framework as well 
as an empirical test of the Court use of this somewhat rare event. In 
particular, our article seeks to provide a better understanding of DIG 
process by providing a description of the frequency with which this 
event occurred during the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts. We 
also seek to advance the theoretical understanding of those inter-
Table 6. Dependent Variable: DIGVOTE
















Likelihood Ratio Test  27.00***
***, **, * (signifi cant at .01, .05, .1)
This content downloaded from 128.206.241.13 on Tue, 18 Jun 2013 10:25:33 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michael E. Solimine and Rafael Gely 175
48 See Timothy R. Johnson, et al, The Infl uence of Oral Arguments in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 100 Am Pol Sci Rev 99 (2006).
49 Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert Pool’, 
NY Times at A21 (Sept 26, 2008); Peter B. Rutledge, Clerks, 74 U Chi L Rev 369, 389 n 
48 (2007); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks 
in the Certiorari Process, 85 Tex L Rev 947, 975 (2007).
50 See Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington 
Community (Virginia 1993); Richard L. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within 
the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo L J 1487 
(2008); John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re- Emergence of a Supreme Court 
Bar, 30 J Sup Ct Hist 68 (2004); Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a 
Supreme Court Bar and its Effect on Certiorari, 9 J App Prac & Pro 175 (2007).
ested in Supreme Court decision making, by exploring the factors 
that are likely to affect the Court’s decision to DIG a case.
Our analysis suggests that DIG behavior of the Court is consis-
tent with the strategic model, at least to some extent. The Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts were more likely to DIG and thus leave intact 
decisions that were decided in a conservative direction by the lower 
court. Likewise, cases raising constitutional issues were more likely 
to be DIGged, suggesting that the Court is apt to use the device to 
avoid the apparently more diffi cult and contentious issues raised 
by those cases. Our examination of the Blackmun papers indicates 
that a vote to deny certiorari is associated with a later vote to DIG 
a case, which is suggestive of strategic behavior. On the other hand, 
the relatively small number of DIGs that are not by supermajority 
votes indicates that the Court is faithfully following the Rule of Six 
(albeit with a few exceptions), which we argue is inconsistent with 
the strategic model of DIG decision making.
Several avenues of additional research are suggested by our anal-
ysis. Almost all of the DIGs occur after oral argument has taken place. 
This suggests that additional information is brought to the Court’s 
attention at that point, relevant to the decision to DIG, which is not 
found in papers fi led at the certiorari stage.48 Alternatively, it might 
suggest that the initial discussions among the Justices at the con-
ference immediately following oral argument lay the groundwork 
for a DIG. The infl uence of the Justice’s law clerks on the certiorari 
process has also lately received increased scholarly attention. Some 
of that literature suggests that the clerks who are part of the “cert. 
pool” (i.e., the clerks of the Justices other than John Paul Stevens and 
Samuel Alito who prepare and share memorandum recommending 
whether certiorari petitions should be granted) are “embarrassed” 
by or “dread” a case being DIGged.49 In a similar fashion, for about 
the same period there has developed a specialized group of attorneys 
that regularly represent clients in the Supreme Court, at both the 
certiorari and merits stages.50 Both the certiorari pool and the growth 
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of a sophisticated Supreme Court bar might suggest that the Justices, 
with the aid of their clerks, and of lawyers, would be better able to 
screen out cases that are liable to be DIGged. Further exploration of 
these and other infl uences will give us a fuller picture of the use of 
the DIG by the Court as a whole and by individual Justices.
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